Introduction
The protection of a minor’s property under Hindu law is a cornerstone of the legal system, designed to shield the vulnerable from exploitation, and this framework is primarily established by the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (HMGA). Section 8 of the HMGA imposes a strict obligation on a natural guardian: they are forbidden from selling or otherwise transferring a minor’s immovable property without first obtaining the prior permission of the court. Any disposal of property in contravention of this requirement is clearly stipulated in sub-section (3) as being voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. This critical designation of a transaction as “voidable” rather than “void ab initio” has historically led to complex legal wrangling over the precise mechanism and formality required for the former minor to reclaim their right.
For a long period, the prevailing and stricter judicial view maintained that since the unauthorised sale by the guardian was merely voidable, it remained valid and operative until it was formally set aside by a judicial decree. This strict interpretation effectively mandated repudiation through court proceedings, compelling the minor, upon attaining majority, to file a formal suit for cancellation of the sale deed within the three-year limitation period prescribed under Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Exemplifying this view, the Supreme Court in Vishwambhar and Ors. vs. Laxminarayan (Dead) and Anr. (2001)1 unequivocally held that the plaintiffs, who were former minors, were required to get the alienations set aside if they wanted to avoid the transfers and regain the properties. This precedent was further relied upon in Nangali Amma Bhavani Amma vs Gopalkrishnan Nair and Ors. (2004)2, where the Division Bench observed that a suit must be filed by the minor to avoid the transaction within the prescribed period. Similarly, in Murugan & Ors. vs Kesava Gounder (Dead) through legal representatives & Ors. (2019)3, the Court stated that voidable alienations are required to be set aside before the relief of possession can be claimed by the former minor. Failing to file a separate cancellation suit was thus considered fatal to the minor’s claim, as the voidable transaction would then mature into a fully valid one.
This rigid procedural requirement was recently challenged and fundamentally liberalised by the Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of K. S. Shivappa v. Smt. K. Neelamma (2025)4. The Court was tasked with resolving the question of whether a minor who has attained majority must necessarily file a civil suit to set aside the voidable sale, or if an action that clearly communicates their refusal to accept the sale is sufficient. The Court reasoned that while Section 8(3) uses the term “voidable,” the Act nowhere categorically provides the manner in which such a transaction would be avoided. The Court held that a minor can repudiate a voidable transaction either expressly by instituting a suit or impliedly by their unequivocal conduct.
To support this liberal and practical interpretation, the Court relied upon several key precedents. A primary authority was the century-old case of Abdul Rahman vs. Sukhdayal Singh (1905)5, which observed that the act of the minor selling the property on attaining majority was sufficient to repudiate the guardian’s unauthorized lease, making a formal suit unnecessary. The Court also cited Madhegowda vs. Ankegowda (2002)6, which held that the minor, on attaining majority, can repudiate the transfer in any manner when occasion arises, including by transferring their interest in the property in a lawful manner asserting his/her title.
Further persuasive value was drawn from High Court decisions like Chacko Mathew v. Ayyappan Kutty (1961)7, which held that a party can avoid a non-binding transaction by an “unequivocal act repudiating it”, and G. Annamalai Pillai vs The District Revenue Officer, Cuddalore (1984)8, which affirmed that a minor’s resistance to a transferee’s application was valid avoidance. This approach recognizes that “it is not necessary that he should bring a suit”.
The crucial legal rationale established in K. S. Shivappa is the recognition that the act of repudiation, whether formal or by conduct, causes the voidable transaction to relate back to its genesis. By referencing the principle from G. Annamalai Pillai vs District Revenue Officer and Ors. (1993)9, which in turn cited the Privy Council and legal texts, the Court affirmed that once the voidable transfer is avoided or repudiated by the minor, it becomes void from its very inception. This effect is complete, “as if the transaction had never taken place”, meaning no valid right, title, or interest was ever conveyed to the initial purchaser. Thus, the former minor’s act of executing a fresh sale deed within the prescribed period of limitation was deemed a legally sufficient and effective repudiation by conduct, conclusively establishing the new purchaser’s title.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in the present case marks a significant shift in Indian property law, moving from a rigid procedural requirement to a more equitable and realistic recognition of a former minor’s rights. By decisively ruling that the repudiation of a guardian’s unauthorized sale can be achieved through unequivocal conduct such as executing a subsequent sale and not just through a formal suit, the Court has clarified the scope of Section 8 of the HMGA. This ruling, buttressed by established principles from cases like Abdul Rahman and Madhegowda, reinforces the statutory protection afforded to minors, ensuring that their substantive right to reclaim property is not defeated by mere technicalities, and that the unauthorised transaction is correctly deemed void ab initio upon their rightful assertion of title.
Citations
- Vishwambhar and Ors. vs. Laxminarayan (Dead) and Anr. (2001) (2001) 6 SCC 163
- Nangali Amma Bhavani Amma vs Gopalkrishnan Nair and Ors. (2004) (2004) 8 SCC. 785
- Murugan & Ors. vs Kesava Gounder (Dead) through legal representatives & Ors. (2019) 20 SCC. 633
- K. S. Shivappa v. Smt. K. Neelamma (2025) 2025 INSC 1195
- Abdul Rahman vs. Sukhdayal Singh (1905) 1905 SCC OnLine All 106
- Madhegowda vs. Ankegowda (2002) 1 SCC 178
- Chacko Mathew v. Ayyappan Kutty (1961) 1961 SCC OnLine Ker 24
- G. Annamalai Pillai vs The District Revenue Officer, Cuddalore (1984) AIR1985Mad357
- G. Annamalai Pillai vs District Revenue Officer and Ors. (1993) 1984 SCC OnLine Mad 185
Expositor(s): Adv. Archana Shukla