Succession, Assignment, and Copyright: Delhi High Court Denies Interim Injunction in Mrs. Shakti Sagar v. The Delhi Law House

Copyright, being a statutory right, passes from the author to any other person only in the manner the Copyright Act, 1957 prescribes. The Delhi High Court’s decision in Mrs. Shakti Sagar v. The Delhi Law House and Ors.¹ illustrates the consequences of failing to demonstrate that foundation. The Delhi High Court, while dismissing an application filed by the plaintiff, Shakti Sagar, sought an interim injunction restraining the defendants, The Delhi Law House (TDLH), Mohan Sagar, Divya Sagar, and Gaurav Sagar, from directly or indirectly using, transferring, sharing, copying, or otherwise dealing with five titles, primarily comprising legal commentaries. The Court held that a person other than the author can acquire copyright ownership only through an assignment under Section 18 of the Act.² Further, Section 19³ mandates that such an assignment be in writing and signed by the assignor or their duly authorized agent.

Delhi Law House (DLH) has been in existence since 1981, initially constituted orally between R.G. Sagar (HUF), Mohan Sagar (HUF), and B.L. Sagar (HUF), reduced to writing in 1992, and reconstituted in 1996 and 2016. The plaintiff traces her claim to the copyrights of the late R.G. Sagar, who allegedly acquired specific copyrights upon his retirement from M/s Law Book Company in 1961, as recorded in a settlement agreement dated 05.04.1961 and a certificate dated 01.04.1962. These copyrights were subsequently bequeathed to his son, late Subhash Sagar, through a Will dated 17.10.1995, and thereafter to the plaintiff through a Will dated 21.01.2021. The plaintiff also relies on the Guidelines on the Allocation of Copyrights, dated 01.12.1995, which allocated publication rights among Delhi Law House, Law Publishers India Pvt. Ltd., and M/s Law Publishers. She claims to have permitted DLH to publish the titles but not The Delhi Law House (TDLH), an entity allegedly owned by the defendants. According to the plaintiff, during a family meeting on 04.08.2023, the defendants informed her that DLH’s business had ceased in 2021 and had been diverted to other entities. This was followed by the issuance of legal notices and the institution of the present suit.

Disputed Copyright Ownership

The plaintiff contended that she had an unbroken chain of title through successive Wills executed by her father-in-law, R.G. Sagar, and her husband, Subhash Sagar. She relied on TDLH’s 2023 and 2024 catalogues, an invoice dated 23.03.2024, and copies purchased from the open market to allege that the defendants were publishing and selling the titles without a licence and remitting the proceeds to TDLH’s bank account. Relying on Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia,⁴ she argued that an injunction ordinarily follows in cases of copyright infringement and that delay alone does not preclude relief. She further maintained that the copyrights were R.G. Sagar’s individual property, distinct from the partnership’s assets, and were not relinquished upon R.G. Sagar (HUF)’s retirement under the reconstitution deed dated 01.04.2016. In response to the objection under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015,⁵ she relied on Novenco Building and Industry A/S v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions Private Ltd. & Anr.,⁶ arguing that pre-institution mediation cannot be mechanically required in cases of continuing intellectual property infringement. Conversely, the defendants argued that copyright vested in the authors and that no written assignment established its transfer to M/s Law Book Company or R.G. Sagar. They challenged the authenticity and sufficiency of the certificate dated 01.04.1962 and the validity of the Wills dated 17.10.1995 and 21.01.2021, citing suspicious circumstances and disputed execution. They further contended that the reconstitution deed dated 01.04.2016 relinquished R.G. Sagar (HUF)’s rights, title, and interest in DLH, including its goodwill and licences; that Mohan Sagar qualified as the first owner under Section 17⁷ of the Copyright Act, 1957, having managed and updated the books; that permission to DLH constituted relinquishment under Section 21⁸; and that the content was exempt under Section 52(1)(q),⁹ with Sanjiva Row’s Commentary in the public domain. Relying on State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi Devi,¹⁰ the defendants also argued that final relief could not be granted at the interim stage. 

Interim Injunction Test and Establishing Copyright Ownership

Before examining the merits, the Delhi High Court relied on Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh¹¹ to reiterate the three requirements the Apex Court identified for an interim injunction: a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. The Court observed that the three conditions are cumulative, and the applicant must satisfy each. Failure to satisfy any one of them would result in the rejection of the application. The Court first examined whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie right to copyright that was being infringed. Referring to Sections 17,¹² 18, and 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Assn.,¹³ the Court observed that copyright ordinarily vests in the author and that any assignment must be in writing and signed by the assignor or their duly authorised agent. It noted that this requirement was also recognised under Section 5 of the Copyright Act, 1911,¹⁴ thereby also covering the works before the enforcement of the Copyright Act, 1957.  Relying on Tech Plus Media (P) Ltd. v. Jyoti Janda,¹⁵ the Court further held that a plaintiff who is not the author must disclose the work, its author, and the instrument transferring copyright ownership. It also referred to Section 55(2)¹⁶ of the Act and Najma Heptulla v. Orient Longman Ltd.,¹⁷ which recognise the presumption that the person whose name appears on a work as its author is presumed to be the author, unless the contrary is proved. Applying these principles, the Court examined whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie chain of title demonstrating that the copyrights in question had validly devolved upon her.

Prima Facie Ownership, Balance of Convenience, and Irreparable Injury. 

The Court observed that late R.G. Sagar was a publisher, not the author of the works, and that the plaintiff failed to establish how M/s Law Book Company had acquired the copyrights from the original authors. As no assignment deeds were produced, the root of the plaintiff’s title remained unsubstantiated. The Court further noted that neither testator was an author, both Wills were disputed and unproved, and the Guidelines on the Allocation of Copyrights, dated 01.12.1995, did not constitute an instrument of title. Leaving the authenticity of these documents for trial, the Court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie right to the copyrights claimed, as required under Dalpat Kumar. The Court also held that the balance of convenience favoured the defendants, as the titles had been published for decades under DLH, and restraining their publication would cause greater inconvenience. The plaintiff also failed to establish irreparable injury, as the alleged loss of revenue was quantifiable and compensable through a decree for amounts determined upon rendition of accounts. The Court further held that Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd also did not support the plaintiff’s case, as copyright ownership and prior use had been established in the said case. Since the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie right to the copyrights claimed, the question of infringement did not arise at this stage. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the application for an interim injunction

The case underscores that copyright ownership cannot be established through successive Wills alone. A claimant must demonstrate a valid chain of title tracing back to the original acquisition of copyright. The Delhi High Court’s refusal to grant an interim injunction highlights the importance of substantiating ownership before alleging infringement. The judgment further reiterates that interim relief requires establishing a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, reinforcing the need for clear legal evidence to protect copyright claims.

Citations

1. Mrs. Shakti Sagar v. The Delhi Law House & Ors., 2026:DHC 862. ↩︎
2. Copyright Act, 1957, No. 14 of 1957, s. 18 (India). ↩︎
3. Copyright Act, 1957, No. 14 of 1957, s. 19 (India) ↩︎
4. Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia, (2004) 3 SCC 90. ↩︎
5. The Commercial Courts Act, 2015, No. 4 of 2016, s. 12A (India) ↩︎
6. Novenco Building and Industry A/S v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions Private Ltd. & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2278. ↩︎
7. Copyright Act, 1957, No. 14 of 1957, s. 17 (India). ↩︎
8. Copyright Act, 1957, No. 14 of 1957, s. 21 (India). ↩︎
9. Copyright Act, 1957, No. 14 of 1957, s. 52(1)(q) (India). ↩︎
10. State of U.P. v. Ram Sukhi Devi, (2005) 9 SCC 733. ↩︎
11. Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719. ↩︎
12. Copyright Act, 1957, No. 14 of 1957, s. 17 (India). ↩︎
13. Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Assn., (1977) 2 SCC 820. ↩︎
14. Copyright Act, 1911, No. 3 of 1911, s. 5 (India). ↩︎
15. Tech Plus Media (P) Ltd. v. Jyoti Janda, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 181. ↩︎
16. Najma Heptulla v. Orient Longman Ltd., AIR 1989 Del 63. ↩︎
17. Copyright Act, 1957, No. 14 of 1957, s. 55(2) (India). ↩︎

Expositor(s): Adv. Siddharath Shrivastava