Introduction
Can the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 211 override the statutory twin conditions for bail under Section 452 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act? This question lies at the heart of the Supreme Court’s decision in Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement3, where the Court confronted the growing reality of prolonged pre-trial detention in complex economic offence cases.
The judgment addresses a recurring tension in bail jurisprudence: whether the gravity of an offence and statutory bail restrictions can justify continued incarceration when a trial shows no real prospect of timely conclusion. By reaffirming that pre-trial detention cannot be allowed to become a form of punishment, the Supreme Court has recalibrated the balance between statutory rigour and constitutional liberty.
A recurring argument by prosecuting agencies is that economic offenses constitute a “special class” of crimes that warrant a blanket denial of bail. However, a key holding in Arvind Dham is that economic offences cannot be treated as a homogeneous class. Rejecting the argument that the seriousness of these offences alone justifies prolonged incarceration, the Court noted that such crimes vary widely in degree and circumstances. Relying on the decision in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022)4, it was established that each case must be examined on its own facts, including the period of incarceration. In Dham’s case, the Court found it “incredulous” to keep him detained when 210 prosecution witnesses were cited and the trial was still at the stage of document scrutiny.
Reconciling Section 45 PMLA with Article 21
The most contentious aspect of these cases is Section 45 of the PMLA, which imposes the “twin conditions” for bail. Under this provision, a court can only grant bail if:
- The Public Prosecutor is given an opportunity to oppose the application.
- The court is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and that they are unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.
While these conditions are stringent, the Court clarified that they cannot result in indefinite pre-trial detention. Where the maximum sentence is seven years (as under PMLA), and the trial progress is negligible, statutory restrictions cannot override the constitutional safeguards of Article 21. When a trial is not likely to conclude in a reasonable time, the constitutional mandate of liberty must supersede the technical rigors of Section 45.
Judicial Precedents: A Line of Consistency
The Arvind Dham judgment draws heavily on a line of recent precedents where the Supreme Court has prioritized liberty over procedural bottlenecks:
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024)5: The Court granted bail to an accused under the UAPA after four years of custody without charges being framed, holding that bail should not be withheld as a punishment regardless of the crime’s nature.
Manish Sisodia v. Enforcement Directorate (2024)6: In the Delhi Excise Policy case, the Court noted 17 months of custody without trial commencement violated Article 21, stating that trial courts have forgotten the principle that “jail is the exception.”
V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director (2024)7: The Court observed that inordinate delay and high bail thresholds cannot coexist; if a trial is delayed, the right to bail must expand.
Padam Chand Jain v. Enforcement Directorate (2025)8: A three-Judge Bench affirmed that where evidence is largely documentary and already in the custody of the prosecution, the risk of tampering is minimized, further tilting the scales toward the protection of Article 21.
Beyond the statutes, the Court identified specific triggers that necessitate the grant of bail. A crucial factor is the attribution of delay. In Arvind Dham, the Court found that the substantial delay was caused by the Enforcement Directorate itself, which had challenged trial court notices and secured stays that lasted months. When the delay is attributable to the prosecution, the State cannot justify continued incarceration.
Furthermore, the Court subjected the prosecution’s factual objections to rigorous scrutiny. Allegations that the appellant influenced witnesses were found to be unsubstantiated upon a deep dive into the investigation timeline. Ultimately, the judgment solidifies a vital constitutional truth: in a democracy governed by the Rule of Law, the gravity of an allegation is never an excuse for the suspension of a citizen’s fundamental rights.
Conclusion
The Arvind Dham judgment serves as a vital constitutional corrective, ensuring that the “seriousness of the offence” does not become a tool for the indefinite suspension of civil liberties. By prioritizing Article 21 over the procedural rigors of the PMLA, the Supreme Court has sent a clear message: the State cannot use its own inability to conduct a timely trial as a justification for keeping citizens behind bars.
This ruling solidifies the principle that pre-trial detention must remain preventive, not punitive. When the “twin conditions” of Section 45 are pitted against a trial that shows no sign of commencement or conclusion, the fundamental right to liberty must prevail. Ultimately, this narrative shift from “gravity of crime” to “regularity of trial” reinforces the core of Indian democracy that the process itself should never be allowed to become the punishment.
Citations
Expositor(s): Adv. Archana Shukla, Anugya Bhadauria (Intern)
