The Absolute Right of Appeal: Why Revision is Not a Remedy Against Acquittals in NI Act Complaints

The legal landscape surrounding the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) is often a complex intersection of civil liability and criminal penalty. A recurring procedural dilemma for many litigants is determining the appropriate forum and method for challenging a judgment of acquittal. When a trial court or an appellate sessions court clears an accused of charges under Section 138, the complainant is often left at a crossroads: should they seek a revision of the order, or is an appeal the mandated path? This brings us to a critical question: is a Criminal Revision Petition maintainable against a judgment of acquittal in a complaint case where an alternative remedy of appeal exists?.

The answer, as clarified by recent judicial pronouncements, is a definitive no. Under the procedural framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), specifically Section 401(4), if an appeal lies under the Code and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. This principle ensures that revisionary powers are not used as a substitute for an available appellate remedy. In cases involving the dishonour of cheques, the complainant is recognized not just as an informant, but as a “victim” who has suffered a direct loss due to the act of the accused. As a victim, the complainant possesses a statutory right to prefer an appeal against an acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC.

The factual matrix leading to this clarification involved a petitioner, Liji, who had filed two separate complaints under Section 138 of the NI Act. While the initial trial court convicted the accused in both instances, the Additional District and Sessions Court, Muvattupuzha, subsequently acquitted them in Crl. Appeal. Choosing to challenge these acquittals, the petitioner filed Criminal Revision Petitions before the High Court of Kerala. However, the Registry raised a fundamental defect: whether a revision petition was the proper remedy in these circumstances.

In the case of Liji v. State of Kerala¹, the court’s rationale was deeply rooted in the statutory evolution of victim rights. The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s precedent in Celestium Financial (M/s) v. A. Gnanasekaran², which held that a complainant in a Section 138 case is undeniably a victim under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC. The rationale for this is five-fold:

• A victim’s right to appeal must be absolute and not circumscribed by conditions like seeking “special leave” under Section 378(4), which is often required for general complainants.
• The right of a victim must be on par with the right of an accused; just as a convicted person can appeal as a matter of right under Section 374, a victim should have a similar unconditional right to challenge an acquittal.
• The Parliament intended for the proviso of Section 372 to be a standalone, superior right for victims that does not require fulfilling the rigorous conditions of other appellate sections.
• Section 378 was never amended to limit the victim’s right, suggesting the new proviso in Section 372 was meant to expand it.
• Since Section 138 cases are essentially private complaints where State involvement is minimal, the complainant’s status as the primary victim must be prioritized in the trial and appeal process.

This interpretation significantly interlinks the NI Act with the broader procedural mandates of the CrPC and the newly enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). Specifically, the right to prefer an appeal for a complainant in a Section 138 case now falls under Section 378 or the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC (now corresponding to Section 419 and the proviso to Section 413 of the BNSS). Because these statutory avenues for appeal are available, the High Court’s revisionary jurisdiction is barred by Section 401(4) of the CrPC.

Conclusion

The Kerala High Court held that the revision petitions filed by the petitioner were not maintainable because she had an available remedy through an appeal. While the revision petitions were rejected, the court granted the petitioner the liberty to prefer an appeal and clarified that the time spent pursuing the revision petitions would be excluded when calculating the limitation period for the new appeal. This judgment reinforces that “victims” in cheque dishonour cases hold a privileged appellate position, but they must strictly adhere to the correct procedural path choosing appeal over revision to seek justice.

Citations

1. Liji v. State of Kerala Crl. Rev. Pet No. 58 of 2026, decided on 11-2-2026 ↩︎
2. Celestium Financial (M/s) v. A. Gnanasekaran 2025 INSC 804 ↩︎

Expositor(s): Adv. Archana Shukla