When medieval alchemists failed to turn lead into gold, the failure was never in the ambition; it was in a fundamental misreading of the raw material. Lead and gold are different things, and no furnace, however powerful, can complete a transformation that the base element will not support. The same principle governs criminal adjudication, as no theory of guilt can stand where the evidentiary foundation itself is incomplete. When Delhi’s Rouse Avenue Court discharged the accused in the case of Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation1 (and the related money laundering matter involving Manish Sisodia and K. Kavitha) on February 27, 2026, it did not declare the allegations fictitious but found the prosecution’s evidentiary formula legally insufficient.The court observed that the investigation, led by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) into the predicate corruption charges and the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) into the money laundering trail, had attempted to artificially weave missing links to bind incompatible evidentiary elements through narrative. The prosecution’s primary raw material was approver testimony, yet it lacked the essential reagent of independent corroboration capable of establishing that a deliberate agreement to commit an unlawful act had actually been made. Without that reagent, the formula collapses, echoing the standard in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra2 that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.
The Recurring Evidentiary Gap in High-Profile Economic Crime Prosecutions
The failure visible in the Excise Policy proceedings is not an isolated event. Over the past two decades, several high-profile economic crime prosecutions in India have faced the same structural difficulty: attempts to convert administrative irregularities or regulatory controversies into criminal liability without producing evidence capable of proving criminal intent beyond reasonable doubt.
Under the contemporary statutory framework, offences such as cheating under Section 318 of the BNS3, and criminal conspiracy under Section 61 BNS4 require proof of dishonest intention at inception and a demonstrable agreement to commit an unlawful act. These provisions preserve the core doctrinal safeguards developed under earlier law, ensuring that a “base element” of administrative error is not forcefully transmuted into the “gold” of criminal conviction
This evidentiary gap is most clearly illustrated in the 2G Spectrum Case5, where the prosecution alleged a large-scale conspiracy in the allocation of telecom licences involving A. Raja and corporate executives such as Sanjay Chandra. Despite extensive allegations of procedural deviation and significant projected loss to the public exchequer, the Special Court in its 2017 judgment held that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of a legally sustainable conspiracy or any quid pro quo arrangement. When assessed through the lens of present-day law, the outcome reflects a failure to satisfy the essential ingredients of BNS, specifically, proof of a clear agreement supported by credible evidence and the presence of dishonest inducement. This judgment underscores that policy decisions, even if retrospectively questioned, cannot be criminalized without demonstrable intent and unlawful gain.
A similar evidentiary limitation is visible in the NSE Co-location Case6 concerning the National Stock Exchange of India. The allegations centred on preferential access to trading infrastructure, potentially enabling certain brokers to gain a time advantage in executing trades. However, the acceptance of the closure report indicates that while the conduct may have warranted regulatory intervention, the material on record did not establish the ingredients of criminal offences under the BNS framework. In particular, the absence of proof of fraudulent intention at the inception of the conduct meant that the high thresholds for cheating and conspiracy could not be met. This establishes the principle that regulatory infractions in sophisticated financial markets do not automatically translate into criminal culpability.
The same doctrinal position is reflected in the Coal Allocation Scam cases7 involving public officials such as H. C. Gupta. Despite the significant notional loss figures cited in public discourse, courts examining these prosecutions consistently held that irregularities in administrative processes do not amount to criminal offences in the absence of clear evidence of mens rea. Under the framework of BNS mere participation in a decision-making process cannot be equated with conspiracy unless a prior agreement to commit an unlawful act is established, and similarly, without proof of dishonest intention or inducement, the offence of cheating cannot be sustained. The acquittals in several of these cases affirm that criminal liability cannot be inferred from flawed governance alone.
A distinct but equally important concern arises in prosecutions involving Nitin Sandesara, Chetan Sandesara8, and Arvind Dham9, where allegations of large-scale financial irregularities have been investigated under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The stringent bail regime under Section 45 of the PMLA10 must now be understood alongside the broader procedural safeguards under the BNSS, 2023, and continues to embody the constitutional mandate of personal liberty. The Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation11 articulated a principle that remains fully applicable under the new procedural regime: that bail is the rule and jail the exception, and that pre-trial detention cannot be justified solely on the gravity of allegations. This principle assumes particular importance in complex economic offences, where investigations are prolonged and evidence is largely documentary.
Conclusion
The acquittals and discharges in these prosecutions do not settle the wider debates about policy decisions or regulatory failures; rather, they clarify the limits of criminal law. As the Supreme Court held in Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh12, when evidence admits two interpretations, the one favouring the accused must prevail. Cases ranging from the Delhi Excise Policy Case to the Coal Allocation Scam demonstrate that allegations, however serious or financially significant, cannot sustain criminal liability without proof of mens rea, conspiracy, or fraudulent intent. As reiterated in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof. Ultimately, these cases show that in economic crime prosecutions, conviction depends not on the scale of the accusation but on the strength of the evidence. Without credible proof, the alchemy of accusation cannot produce the gold of conviction.
Citations
Expositor(s): Adv. Aparna Shukla
