Does a stringent special statute like the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), designed to safeguard the nation’s economic integrity, have the power to indefinitely suspend the fundamental right to life and liberty? This question lies at the heart of the recent judgment delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dharam Singh Chhoker vs. Directorate of Enforcement (2026)1. The Court addressed this by affirming that while the “twin conditions” of Section 45 PMLA are mandatory, they exist in a delicate balance with Article 21 of the Constitution2. In Chhoker’s case, the Court determined that the petitioner failed to tip the scales in his favor, as his own conduct marked by evasion and procedural delays undermined his plea for constitutional protection against prolonged incarceration.
The factual matrix of the case centers on a massive alleged fraud involving the Mahira Group, a conglomerate controlled by Dharam Singh Chhoker and his family. The group, through its entity M/s Sai Aaina Farms Pvt. Ltd. (SAFPL), launched an affordable housing project in Sector 68, Gurugram, in 2017, collecting approximately ₹363 crores from 1,500 home buyers. However, instead of constructing the promised flats by the 2021-22 deadline, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) alleged that the group siphoned off and laundered proceeds of crime totaling ₹616 crore.
The investigation, formalised in an ECIR dated November 16, 2021, revealed a complex web of money laundering where funds were allegedly diverted through associate companies like M/s DS Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. to fund personal expenditures, including jewellery and wedding expenses. Despite the gravity of the allegations, Chhoker remained elusive for nearly two years, failing to comply with 17 summons issued between July 2023 and December 2024. His eventual arrest on May 4, 2025, occurred only after a “hot pursuit” at a New Delhi hotel following a directive from a Division Bench.
The court’s rationale for denying bail was rooted in a meticulous comparison between the petitioner’s circumstances and emerging Supreme Court jurisprudence on Article 21. While the defense relied heavily on V. Senthil Balaji v. ED (2024) and Arvind Dham v. ED (2026)3 to argue that “prolonged incarceration” violates the right to a speedy trial, the Court found these precedents distinguishable. In Senthil Balaji, the trial involved over 2,000 accused and 600 witnesses, making a timely conclusion impossible.
In contrast, Chhoker’s trial involves only 15 accused and 48 witnesses, with the Court noting that the trial is now “set to commence” following the taking of cognizance on January 8, 2026. Crucially, the Court held that the delay in proceedings could not be attributed to the ED; rather, it was the petitioner who stalled the process by challenging cognizance and raising procedural objections regarding document delivery. Furthermore, the “outrageous attempt to flee” during his arrest solidified the ED’s assertion that Chhoker remained a significant flight risk.
Ultimately, the Dharam Singh Chhoker case reinforces that Article 214 is not a default “get out of jail free” card for those accused of large-scale economic fraud. The judiciary has established a “conduct filter”: where an accused actively evades the law and contributes to trial delays, the statutory rigors of Section 45 PMLA5 will remain an insurmountable wall. The judgment serves as a stern reminder that the “sacrosanct” right to liberty is inextricably tied to the duty of the accused to submit to the due process of law. While the door of constitutional relief remains open, it is only accessible to those whose continued detention has truly transitioned from a necessary legal measure to an arbitrary punishment.
Coclusion
The Dharam Singh Chhoker case (2026) reinforces a critical judicial boundary: while Article 21 remains the heart of the Indian Constitution, it does not function in a legal vacuum. The judgment clarifies that the “sacrosanct” right to liberty is not an unconditional shield for those who actively seek to derail the machinery of justice. By introducing and applying what can be termed the “conduct filter,” the High Court has signaled that constitutional compassion is reserved for those who submit to the law, not those who strategically evade it. The interplay between the Section 45 PMLA “twin conditions” and the right to a speedy trial remains a sliding scale, where the “tipping point” for bail is determined by the feasibility of the trial and the bona fides of the accused. Ultimately, the judiciary continues to uphold the PMLA’s stringent standards to protect the nation’s economic fabric, especially when the “proceeds of crime” involve the life savings of thousands of citizens. By keeping the door of Article 21 ajar only for those facing truly arbitrary or indefinite detention, the courts ensure that the PMLA remains a tool for prosecution rather than an instrument of systemic punishment, reminding litigants that the path to constitutional relief must begin with procedural cooperation.
Citations
Expositor(s): Adv. Archana Shukla