Case Docket · Arbitration
Section 34 and the Undecided Good-Faith Plea: Delhi High Court Sets Aside Part of the MMTC v. PAMP Award
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Can a court set aside an international commercial arbitration award because the tribunal never decided a material plea? Yes, the Delhi High Court held in MMTC Ltd. v. PAMP Holding Mauritius Ltd.,1 setting aside part of the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,2 because the tribunal left a good-faith plea undecided.
MMTC Ltd. (MMTC), a Government of India undertaking known until 1995 as the Minerals & Metals Trading Corporation of India Ltd., and PAMP SA, a Swiss refiner, formed MMTC-PAMP India Pvt. Ltd. (MPIPL) under a Share Purchase and Shareholders Agreement (SPSHA) signed on 22 October 2008. PAMP held 72% and MMTC 26%; PAMP’s shares later passed to PAMP Holding Mauritius Ltd. (PHML). MPIPL signed a Dore Sourcing Agreement (DSA) with MKS Switzerland SA, a PAMP group company, on 2 February 2012, and a Process Know-How Licence Agreement with PAMP, dated 9-11 July 2012, paying them about Rs 71.25 crore by 31 March 2015. MMTC invoked arbitration against PHML and MPIPL on 13 April 2015. By its award of 11 December 2016, the tribunal dismissed every claim and ordered it to pay costs of about Rs 1.77 crore to PHML and Rs 1.24 crore to MPIPL. MMTC then challenged the award under Section 34 before the Delhi High Court in the present case, and on 3 November 2026 the court partly allowed the petition.
How far can a court interfere with an international commercial arbitration award under Section 34?
Only on the narrow grounds in Section 34(2). PHML is incorporated in Mauritius, and the court held that its presence as a party was enough on its own to make this an international commercial arbitration under Section 2(1)(f)(ii) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.3 Patent illegality, an illegality appearing on the face of the award, was therefore unavailable, because Section 34(2A) reaches only awards in other arbitrations.4
The court then examined Section 34(2)(b)(ii), under which an award may be set aside if it “is in conflict with the public policy of India”. Explanation 1 lists fraud or corruption (or a breach of Section 75 or Section 81), contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, and conflict with “the most basic notions of morality or justice”.5 Relying on OPG Power Generation Pvt. Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Pvt. Ltd.,6 it required an error crossing a high statutory threshold, noting the Supreme Court’s explanation that the 2015 amendment deliberately narrowed “public policy of India” so that courts would not rehear disputes, and that the justice limb applies only where the injustice shocks the court’s conscience. OPG Power cuts both ways: it sets a high bar, but it also lets a court explain an award’s underlying reason where that reason can be discerned “on a careful reading of the entire award”.7
The Good Faith Argument: was MMTC’s Article 34 plea ever decided?
No. The Delhi High Court found that the tribunal never decided MMTC’s good-faith plea under Article 34.1 of the SPSHA, which requires transactions between a party, or a company it controls, and MPIPL to be “conducted in good faith” and on the agreed basis or, failing that, at arm’s length. MMTC argued that it was not consulted on the two agreements, learnt of the DSA only months after signing, and that PHML used its Board majority to procure both, so the joint venture paid PAMP’s group for help PAMP had already undertaken to give.
PHML answered that PAMP paid for its 72% with capital rather than a promise of free services, and that Article 34 permitted agreements with associated companies on agreed or arm’s-length terms. Before the tribunal it had said both agreements were made in good faith, since without MKS Switzerland’s supply of Dore the joint venture would have collapsed. Before the court, PHML added that it received none of the payments and that the tribunal’s findings could not be reopened under Section 34, “particularly since the arbitration is an international commercial arbitration”.
The sides differed on what Article 34 demanded: for MMTC, good faith was a separate duty, broken by how the agreements were procured; for PHML, the arm’s-length and no-evidence findings answered it and could not be reopened.
Good faith needed its own decision, the court held, and the tribunal had not given one. It noted MMTC’s contentions, but its analysis “focused primarily” on arm’s length. It found the deals at arm’s length, with no contrary evidence from MMTC, yet returned no finding on good faith, which the court called “a mandatory condition precedent” to the arm’s-length question.
To test that omission, the court took as its guide the ruling of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (2026),8 which cuts for MMTC. The High Court read it to mean that a tribunal must decide the material disputes and defences put to it, and that a complete failure to decide one, causing actual prejudice, may breach natural justice and the most basic notions of justice. An incorrect finding ordinarily cannot be reopened, but failing to decide a material issue is a failure to exercise the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and “may attract Sections 34(2)(a)(iii), 34(2)(a)(iv) and 34(2)(b)(ii), read with Explanation 1(iii)”.9
A missing express finding, the court cautioned, would not matter “if the Tribunal’s reasoning, read as a whole, effectively dealt with that allegation”, but here the plea was “completely left unadjudicated”. The court drew from OPG Power10 a distinction between inadequate reasoning and what it called “a complete absence of intelligible reasoning on a material issue”, placed the omission in the second category, and held that it “could be brought within the ground for interference under Section 34”, without naming a single sub-clause. Even if PAMP’s services were not meant to be free, the omission caused MMTC “grave material prejudice”. That finding does not deal with the tribunal’s alternative holding that even if the agreements fell foul of Article 34.1, “it has no legal consequences in this arbitration”, because the tribunal could not modify them or set them aside.
Conclusion: what did the court hold, and why does it matter?
The court partly allowed the petition, setting aside the award “to the extent that it dismisses MMTC’s surviving claims for breach of the SPSHA and the related monetary relief” and the costs ordered on it. The parts on prayers MMTC did not pursue stand, there was no remand, and the parties may pursue “any remedy as available in law” on the surviving dispute. It gave no view on whether PAMP could charge the fees or whether good faith was breached. For a party challenging an international commercial arbitration award under Section 34, the ruling treats a tribunal’s failure to decide a material plea, with real prejudice, as a ground distinct from deciding it wrongly, one that survives where patent illegality does not.
Citations
- MMTC Ltd. v. PAMP Holding Mauritius Ltd., O.M.P. (COMM) 188/2017 (Delhi High Court, decided on Nov. 3, 2026). ↩︎
- The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act 26 of 1996), s. 34. ↩︎
- Id., s. 2(1)(f)(ii). ↩︎
- Id., s. 34(2A); see also Kings & Alliance LLP, “Bombay High Court Clarifies the Scope of Section 34 Challenges in International Commercial Arbitration: ONGC v. Sapura Fabrication” knallp.com (last visited on Nov. 14, 2026). ↩︎
- Id., s. 34(2)(b)(ii), Explanation 1. ↩︎
- OPG Power Generation Pvt. Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Pvt. Ltd., (2025) 2 SCC 417. ↩︎
- Ibid. ↩︎
- Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6121. ↩︎
- Supra note 1; supra note 2, ss. 34(2)(a)(iii), 34(2)(a)(iv), 34(2)(b)(ii). ↩︎
- Supra note 6. ↩︎
Expositor(s): Adv. Siddharath Shrivastava
This article is for information only and is not legal advice. Read the disclaimer