Case Docket · Taxation law

A 27-Year Wait for Nothing: How a Landmark Sales Tax Reference Became Infructuous

11 min read Adv. Stephin Sinu Oommen


A-27-Year-Wait-for-Nothing-How-a-Landmark-Sales-Tax-Reference-Became-Infructuous-1

Can a State impose a surcharge that is calculated, not on the basis of the dealer’s turnover, but on the sales tax payable by him, and still treat it as a tax on the sale of goods? Or does calculating the surcharge on the tax already payable make it an impermissible tax on a tax under Entry 54 of List II?1 

That question was first referred to in 1998 and later enlarged in 1999, before finally reaching a Seven-Judge Constitutional Bench in November 2026. However, the legal landscape had changed considerably by then. Subsequent judicial decisions had reshaped the understanding of what constitutes a tax, while the introduction of GST had altered the constitutional framework governing the State’s power to tax the sale of goods.

The Origins of the Reference: Three Disputes, One Seven-Judge Bench

The matters arose from three distinct sets of proceedings, each involving a different State enactment. The lead matter came from Orissa. Section 5-A of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, inserted in 1990,2 required dealers with gross turnover exceeding Rs. 10 lakh to pay a surcharge of 10 per cent on the sales tax otherwise payable. The provision also barred dealers from passing the surcharge on to their purchasers. Arjun Flour Mills and other dealers challenged the provision, but the Orissa High Court upheld it, following two decisions of the Supreme Court that had considered similar schemes before.3

The second set of proceedings arose from Punjab. Sections 5(1-C) and 30-AA of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948,4 introduced a similar surcharge of 10 per cent on the sales tax payable. Section 30-AA, however, introduced a distinct complication by requiring industrial units enjoying an exemption from sales tax under Section 30-A to pay the surcharge nonetheless. The Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld both provisions. 

The third dispute, also from Punjab, concerned the Punjab Social Security Act, 2000.5 The Act imposed a cess calculated as a percentage of the sales tax payable, with the proceeds earmarked for a Social Security Fund. The Punjab and Haryana High Court struck down the levy because the proceeds were credited directly to the Fund without first forming part of the Consolidated Fund of the State, as required under Article 266 of the Constitution.6 The matter was tagged with the other proceedings because it shared the preliminary question of legislative competence, although its Article 266 challenge raised a separate issue.

The proceedings reached the Supreme Court between 1994 and 2008. What brought them together was the question of whether a surcharge calculated as a percentage of the sales tax payable could be sustained under the State’s taxing power in Entry 54 of List II.7 

What Is Taxed, and How Is It Calculated?

Entry 54 of List II, before its substitution in the GST era, conferred on States the power to tax the sale or purchase of goods, subject to Parliament’s power over inter-State sales under Entry 92-A of List I. The dealer’s argument rested on a distinction between the subject of a tax, or what is being taxed, and its measure, the basis on which the amount payable is calculated. Their objection was that a surcharge calculated directly on turnover would be a tax on the sale of goods, but one calculated on the sales tax payable was imposed on the tax itself. On that reasoning, the levy fell outside the scope of Entry 54.

The Supreme Court accepted the distinction between the subject and measure of a tax but rejected the argument that the method of calculation changed the character of the levy. Sales tax is itself calculated as a percentage of turnover. A surcharge of 10 per cent on sales tax, which is levied at 10 per cent of turnover, therefore amounts to an additional 1 per cent of turnover. The surcharge does not cease to be connected to the sale merely because it is calculated through the sales tax payable. The method used to determine the amount of a tax, the Court explained, does not necessarily alter its character. In reaching this conclusion, it relied on Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International8 which held that the nature of the levy is to be distinguished from the measure of the levy, and that the measure adopted for assessing a tax does not determine its character. The Court further illustrated this principle through Article 271 of the Constitution,9 which permits Parliament to impose a surcharge on specified Union taxes and duties.

Tracing the Conflict: Two Consistent Rulings and One Apparent Contradiction

The challenge was not being raised against a blank slate. In S. Kodar v. State of Kerala (1974),10 A Five-Judge Constitution Bench had already upheld a similar scheme under the Tamil Nadu Additional Sales Tax Act, 1970. The scheme went further than the Orissa provision by expressly prohibiting dealers from passing the additional tax on to purchasers. The Court held that the levy was, in substance, an enhancement of the rate of sales tax for dealers whose turnover exceeded a specified threshold. The fact that the additional tax was calculated as a percentage of the sales tax payable did not alter its character as a tax on the sale of goods. Nearly a decade later, Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983)11 applied the same reasoning to a Bihar surcharge. The levy was similarly calculated as a percentage of the sales tax payable by dealers above a prescribed turnover threshold, with the legislation also prohibiting them from collecting the surcharge from purchasers. Although the levy’s relatability to Entry 54 was fairly conceded before the Court, Hoechst reaffirmed the reasoning in S. Kodar, and rejected the argument that the surcharge became a tax on income merely because dealers could not pass it on to purchasers. The apparent difficulty came from a third decision. In India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1990),12 A Seven-Judge Bench struck down a cess imposed under the Madras Panchayats Act on mining royalty payable under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.13 The majority proceeded on the basis that royalty was itself a tax and held that the State Legislature lacked competence to impose a further cess on it, since the relevant legislative field was occupied by the Central legislation. The decision was therefore read as casting doubt on the validity of a levy calculated by reference to another levy.

This perceived conflict led to the reference. On 13 August 1998, a Two-Judge Bench considered that Hoechst and India Cement appeared to take different views on the nature of a levy calculated with reference to another levy. When the matter came before a Five-Judge Bench in 1999, it noted that the correctness of S. Kodar would also have to be considered. Since reconsideration of a decision rendered by a Five-Judge Bench required a Bench of greater strength, the matter was referred to a Seven-Judge Bench.

On examining the three decisions, the Seven-Judge Bench found that the conflict was more apparent than real. India Cement was specifically whether the State could impose a cess on royalty payable under the Central mining legislation. Its conclusion turned on the nature of royalty and the legislative competence of the State to impose a levy on it. The Court also noted that India Cement had approved an earlier principle laid down in M/s Guruswamy & Co. v. State of Mysore:14 that a cess levied as an increment to an existing tax must be judged in the same way as the tax to which it is levied. The invalidity in India Cement, therefore, did not arise from the method of computation, but from the lack of State legislative competence over the underlying levy.

The Reference No Longer Had a Question to Answer 

The Court held that even if India Cement were given the wider interpretation advanced by the assessees, that reading no longer held the field. In State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. (2004),15 a Five-Judge Constitution Bench treated the statement that “royalty is a tax” as an inadvertent error, clarifying that the intended observation was that a cess on royalty is a tax. It also recognised that royalty itself was a payment for the right to extract minerals.

The position was settled by a Nine-Judge Bench in Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024)(MADA),16 which held that royalty is contractual consideration, not a tax, and overruled India Cement to that extent. The premise that had allowed the mining cess to be characterised as a tax on a tax therefore no longer survived.

The Court also considered the pending curative petition against MADA and the insertion of Section 9-D into the MMDR Act in 2026. It held that neither development affected the relevant findings in MADA or its approval of the principle in S. Kodar. The apparent conflict with S. Kodar had thus ceased to exist.

A Constitutional Entry That No Longer Exists

The Court added a second, independent reason to close the reference. The general power under the old Entry 54, the one under which the Orissa and Punjab surcharges were enacted, no longer exists. It was replaced first by Value Added Tax legislation in both States, and then, with the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016, by a new Entry 54 confined to petroleum crude, high speed diesel, motor spirit (petrol), natural gas, aviation turbine fuel and alcoholic liquor for human consumption, alongside the concurrent GST power under the newly inserted Article 246A. A question about a taxing power that no longer operates in that form, the Court reasoned, has no prospective significance left to decide.

That did not mean the dealers’ appeals simply vanished. Liability for the old assessment years still stands to be worked out, and the Court was careful to say so: those individual claims would now go back to regular Benches, to be decided under the law as it stands, rather than kept waiting for a Seven-Judge answer to a question the law had, in the meantime, already settled.

What the Court Held

Chief Justice Surya Kant, writing for himself and five other Judges, held that the reference had been rendered academic and answered it as infructuous. The competence of States to levy such surcharges, he held, stands governed by S. Kodar, which continues to hold the field, is not in conflict with any existing decision of the Court, and needs no fresh pronouncement from a Bench of seven.

Justice K.V. Viswanathan, writing separately, arrived at the same destination by a more direct road. Rather than resting on the reference having gone academic, his opinion works through S. Kodar, Hoechst, India Cement and MADA on their merits, and holds in terms that S. Kodar was correctly decided, continues to be good law, and requires no reconsideration at all. On that footing, he directed that the Orissa and Punjab sales tax appeals be placed before the Chief Justice for assignment to a regular Bench, and that the Punjab Social Security Act appeals, raising the separate Article 266 question, be segregated for a Division Bench of their own.

The Left Open Window 

Two questions survived the Court’s housekeeping and now travel back down to be decided on their own footing. The first is whether Section 30-AA of the Punjab Act can validly require industrial units, already exempted from sales tax, to pay a surcharge calculated on a tax they do not owe, a question the Bench expressly declined to touch. The second is whether the Punjab Social Security Act cess was rightly struck down for bypassing the Consolidated Fund of the State under Article 266, a question of public finance the Court treated as entirely independent of the Entry 54 dispute. Every other contention in the individual appeals, including questions of assessment and consequential relief, was likewise left for the regular Benches to whom the matters now return.

For a reference that took shape in 1998 and travelled through three enlargements of Bench strength, the outcome turns less on a new rule of tax law than on an old one, applied with care: the character of a tax is fixed by what it taxes, not by the formula used to work out how much is owed. S. Kodar said as much in 1974, and fifty-two years, three statutes, and one constitutional amendment later, the Supreme Court found no reason, and indeed no live occasion, to say otherwise.

Citations

  1. The Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 54 ↩︎
  2. The Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Orissa Act 14 of 1947), s. 5-A, inserted by the Orissa Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1990 (Orissa Act 11 of 1990). ↩︎
  3. Arjun Flour Mills v. State of Odisha Finance Department Secretary & Ors., 2026 INSC 1192. ↩︎
  4. The Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (Punjab Act 46 of 1948), ss. 5(1-C), 30-AA. ↩︎
  5. Punjab Social Security Act, 2000 (Punjab Act 10 of 2000), s. 3. ↩︎
  6. The Constitution of India, art. 266 ↩︎
  7. Supra note 1 ↩︎
  8. Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd., (1984) 1 SCC 467. ↩︎
  9. The Constitution of India, art. 271. ↩︎
  10. S. Kodar v. State of Kerala, (1974) 4 SCC 422. ↩︎
  11. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45. ↩︎
  12. India Cement Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (1990) 1 SCC 12. ↩︎
  13. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (Act 67 of 1957). ↩︎
  14. M/s Guruswamy & Co. v. State of Mysore, [1967] 1 SCR 548. ↩︎
  15. State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201. ↩︎
  16. Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India & Anr., (2024) 10 SCC 1. ↩︎

Expositor(s): Adv. Stephin Sinu Oommen

This article is for information only and is not legal advice. Read the disclaimer

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