Can statutory restrictions on bail under special criminal statutes justify prolonged pre-trial incarceration when a trial shows little prospect of early conclusion?
That constitutional question came before the Delhi High Court in Deepak Ramnani v. State of Delhi (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Connected Matters1, arising out of the alleged organised extortion network operated by Sukesh Chandrashekhar from within prison. The case involved allegations of organised crime, hawala transactions and money laundering under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (“MCOCA”) and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”). At the centre of the dispute lay the constitutional tension between the stringent “twin conditions” for bail under special statutes and the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The judgment assumes significance because it revisits the evolving jurisprudence concerning prolonged incarceration, delayed trials and the constitutional limits of statutory bail embargoes.
The Alleged Organised Crime Network
The proceedings arose from bail applications filed by Deepak Ramnani and Pradeep Ramdanee in prosecutions under MCOCA and allied offences. Deepak Ramnani was also an accused in connected proceedings under the PMLA concerning alleged handling and movement of extorted funds through hawala channels. Although Pradeep Ramdanee was also arraigned in the PMLA proceedings, he had already been granted regular bail by the Special Court on August 2, 2022.
According to the prosecution, Sukesh Chandrashekhar operated an organised crime syndicate that extorted money from wealthy individuals, the complainant and other alleged victims through impersonation, intimidation and fraudulent representations while lodged in jail. The prosecution alleged that Deepak Ramnani facilitated hawala transactions and coordinated movement of extorted money through intermediaries connected with the syndicate. Pradeep Ramdanee was alleged to have acted under Deepak’s instructions and was allegedly caught red-handed receiving Rs. 1 crore from the complainant during a trap operation conducted by authorities.
How the Matter Reached the Delhi High Court
As the investigation progressed, multiple accused persons were arrested and supplementary charge sheets were filed. The prosecution case involved voluminous records, several accused persons and numerous witnesses. Although, in the State proceedings, the Special Court passed an Order on Charge on May 30, 2026, formal framing of charges had not taken place by the time the bail applications were heard by the Delhi High Court on June 3, 2026.
The PMLA proceeding stood on a different procedural footing. The High Court recorded that charges had been framed only recently and that the prosecution proposed to examine 311 witnesses, apart from relying on a substantial volume of documents.
The State opposed the MCOCA applications by invoking the restrictive conditions under Section 21(4) of MCOCA. In the PMLA application, the Enforcement Directorate maintained that a prima facie case of money laundering was made out, but accepted without prejudice to its rights in relation to the order granting bail to Leena Paulose that Deepak was entitled to parity with her on the issue of prolonged incarceration.
Both Section 21(4) of MCOCA and Section 45 of the PMLA prescribe restrictive conditions for bail. The Court was nevertheless required to consider their operation alongside the applicants’ Article 21 claims and the distinct case-specific grounds advanced in the State and PMLA proceedings.
Rival Contentions Before the Court
The prosecution argued that Deepak Ramnani was not merely a financial intermediary but an active participant in the organised crime syndicate. Statements recorded under Section 18 of MCOCA, telephone connectivity between the accused and co-accused persons, alleged hawala transactions and use of pseudonyms while dealing with victims were relied upon to establish involvement in organised crime activities.
The defence, however, argued that continued incarceration despite delayed trial effectively converted pre-trial detention into punishment before conviction. It was contended that the accused had already undergone several years in custody while the trial remained unlikely to conclude within a reasonable period.
A significant argument advanced in the PMLA proceedings concerned Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”). The defence argued that Section 479 applied even to prosecutions under the PMLA and that Deepak Ramnani had already undergone custody of approximately four years and nine months, exceeding half of the maximum sentence of seven years prescribed under the PMLA. Consequently, it was argued that he became entitled to the statutory benefit of bail notwithstanding the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA.
The defence also relied heavily upon parity, in the PMLA proceedings, pointing out that 13 out of 18 co-accused persons, including Leena Paulose, Arun Muthu and Avtar Singh, had already been granted bail and that the Enforcement Directorate had not challenged those orders.
The Court expressly declined to consider parity in the State proceedings. The reasoning in certain earlier MCOCA bail orders had been set aside by the Supreme Court, while the State’s appeal concerning Avtar Singh had become infructuous following his death. The MCOCA applications were therefore determined independently on their merits.
Constitutional Scrutiny of Bail under MCOCA and PMLA
The principal constitutional issue before the Delhi High Court concerned the interplay between Article 21 and statutory bail restrictions under special statutes.
In addressing this issue, the Court relied substantially upon the three-judge bench decision in K.A. Najeeb v. Union of India,2 where the Supreme Court held that constitutional courts retain authority to grant bail notwithstanding statutory embargoes where prolonged incarceration and delayed trial threaten constitutional guarantees.
However, the jurisprudential position was not entirely settled. The Court examined the subsequent two-judge bench decision in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency3, which expressed reservations regarding the reasoning adopted in Gulfisha Fatima4. The Delhi High Court noted that Syed Iftikhar Andrabi reaffirmed K.A. Najeeb’s warning that a statutory embargo cannot become the “sole metric” for denial of bail, while expressing serious reservations about the manner in which Gulfisha Fatima had applied K.A. Najeeb.
The Court further noted that in a subsequent Supreme Court order in Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, referred to in the judgment as “Tasleem Ahmed 25”, the Supreme Court recognised the apparent conflict between Gulfisha Fatima and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi and referred the issue for consideration by a larger Bench. In light of this unresolved conflict, the Delhi High Court adopted what it described as a “practical approach” rather than treating the law as conclusively settled.
The Court first considered whether the applicants would be entitled to bail even under the fact-sensitive approach adopted in Gulfisha Fatima, as understood by the Delhi High Court in Leena Paulose-II6. Having answered that question in the affirmative, it found it unnecessary to conclusively reconcile the competing formulations in Gulfisha Fatima and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi.
The Court separately considered authorities concerning prolonged incarceration under special statutes, the application of Section 436A CrPC and Section 479 BNSS to PMLA proceedings, the binding force of decisions rendered by Benches of differing or coordinate strength, and the relevance of an accused’s attributed role under MCOCA.
The Delhi High Court reiterated that while special statutes impose stricter standards governing bail, constitutional courts cannot ignore prolonged incarceration and delayed trials while evaluating Article 21 concerns. The Court clarified that mere passage of time does not automatically entitle an accused to bail; however, factors such as length of custody, progress of trial, proportionality of detention and likelihood of early conclusion of proceedings remain constitutionally relevant considerations.
Applying these principles to the State proceedings, the Court considered the applicants’ custody of almost four years and ten months, the scale and stage of the trial, and the differentiated roles attributed to Deepak and Pradeep. It characterised Deepak’s alleged collection and distribution activities as logistical facilitation undertaken on Sukesh’s instructions, without prima facie material indicating strategic command or conceptualisation of the foundational offence. Pradeep’s narrower alleged role was characterised as financial facilitation.
In the PMLA proceeding, the Court separately held that Deepak’s custody of four years and nine months exceeded the one-half threshold contemplated by Section 479 BNSS. Relying on Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary7 and Ajay Ajit Peter Kelkar, it held that the provision applied to PMLA proceedings despite the rigours of Section 45. The Court also granted8 Deepak the benefit of parity with 13 co-accused whose cases were not regarded as standing on a less serious footing.
Conclusion
The ruling in Deepak Ramnani v. State of Delhi & Connected Matters is an important contribution to the evolving jurisprudence concerning prolonged incarceration under special criminal statutes. Rather than treating Article 21 and statutory bail restrictions as mutually exclusive considerations, the Delhi High Court recognised that prolonged pre-trial detention must be examined against Article 21 alongside the applicable statutory restrictions and the facts of the individual case.
Significantly, the judgment also reflects the present uncertainty within Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the precise scope of constitutional intervention in cases involving statutory bail embargoes. By acknowledging the pending reference arising from the apparent conflict between Gulfisha Fatima and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, the Delhi High Court consciously avoided treating the law as conclusively settled and instead adopted a pragmatic constitutional approach.
The judgment underscores the relevance of prolonged incarceration, the stage and likely duration of trial, the accused’s attributed role and the prima facie material on record. In PMLA proceedings, Section 479 BNSS and parity may provide additional and independent grounds for release.
Equally, the ruling demonstrates that statutory bail restrictions remain material, but are not examined in isolation from Article 21, sentence exposure, the progress of trial and the individual circumstances of the accused.
Citations
Expositor(s): Adv. Aparna Shukla, Intern Divyanshi Srivastava
