ARBITRA May 2026 – Your Monthly Guide to Navigate the Evolving Landscape of Arbitration
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Read More ››Can a party seek a review of an order passed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly when the original order was based on their own concession and a patently vague arbitration clause? This critical question was addressed by the High Court of Calcutta in Krishnendu Mondal v. Swapan Dey1, where the court examined the limits of judicial intervention and the essential requirements of a binding arbitration agreement. The factual matrix of this case centers on an application seeking a review of an order dated 19 April 2024, which had dismissed a Section 11 application for the appointment of an arbitrator. During the initial hearing, the petitioner had conceded that the application was misconceived as there was no valid or subsisting arbitration clause. However, the petitioner subsequently sought a review, arguing that despite the cryptic nature of the clause, the use of the word “Arbitrator” signaled a clear intention to refer disputes to arbitration.
Procedural Barriers and the Requirement of Substantive Intent
The court’s rationale for dismissing the review application was multi-faceted, addressing both procedural maintainability and the substantive law of contracts. Firstly, the court emphasized that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is a self-contained code with limited scope for judicial intervention. Relying on BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd.2 and Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd.3 The court held that any attempt to review a Section 11 order undermines the principle of minimal judicial interference and “goes against the grain of the Act”. The court noted that the proper remedy for a party aggrieved by such an order is to approach the Supreme Court or raise jurisdictional questions before the Arbitral Tribunal, rather than attempting to re-agitate issues through the “back-door” of review. Furthermore, the court highlighted that since the original order was passed at the invitation and concession of the petitioner’s own counsel, the petitioner was estopped from seeking a review, noting that a mere change of advocates does not provide a ground to reopen recorded concessions.
On the merits of the arbitration clause itself, the court found the language used in Clause 17 “in event of any problem that the both party can appoint any Arbitrator with the consent of the other party” to be “unintelligible and meaningless”. The rationale provided, supported by the landmark ruling in Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander & Ors.4, was that a valid arbitration agreement must reflect a definitive, mutual, and unequivocal intention to refer disputes to a binding resolution. The court observed that the use of the word “can” instead of “shall” indicated a tentative or optional arrangement that required further future consent between the parties, which is insufficient to form a binding contract. Distinguishing this from Visa International Ltd. v. Continental Resources (USA) Ltd.5, where the phrase “shall be finally settled” was used, the court clarified that the mere presence of the word “Arbitrator” does not automatically create a binding obligation if the clause remains contingent or lacks consensus ad idem.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the court’s decision reinforces the necessity for precision in legal drafting and the sanctity of judicial finality in arbitration matters. By dismissing the application on both maintainability and merit, the High Court of Calcutta affirmed that courts will not fill in the gaps for “inartistically drafted” clauses that fail to establish a clear mandate for arbitration. This judgment serves as a stern reminder that once a party concedes the invalidity of a clause, the doors of review are firmly shut, preserving the efficiency and speed that the Arbitration Act intends to provide.
Expositor(s): Adv. Jahnobi Paul