Online Trademark Infringement and the Limits of Contempt Jurisdiction: DRS Logistics v. Google LLC

Search for a brand online today and the first thing a consumer often encounters is not the brand’s official website, but a sponsored advertisement. In digital marketplaces driven by keywords, algorithms, and paid search rankings, consumer attention can be redirected within seconds. For trademark owners, this creates a recurring concern: when competitors or third parties use protected marks in online advertisements, who bears responsibility for the resulting confusion: the advertiser, the intermediary platform, or both?

That question came before the Delhi High Court in DRS Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. Google LLC & Ors.¹, where the Court examined whether intermediary platforms could be held liable for contempt when allegedly infringing advertisements continued appearing online despite earlier judicial directions. The case required the Court to determine the threshold for invoking contempt jurisdiction in trademark disputes arising from sponsored advertisements, Ad-Text, and URLs displayed through digital advertising systems.

Origin of the Dispute and Earlier Trademark Proceedings

The dispute originated from earlier trademark infringement proceedings where the plaintiffs sought protection against unauthorised use of their registered marks, including AGARWAL and AGGARWAL PACKERS AND MOVERS, in online advertising. During those proceedings, Google stated before the Court that its advertising policy did not permit third parties to use a proprietor’s trademark in Ad-Text or Ad-Title and that the policy would be implemented in favour of the plaintiffs. Consequently, the matter before the Court became confined primarily to the issue of whether providing trademarks as keywords to third-party advertisers amounted to trademark infringement.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs alleged that certain advertisers continued using the protected marks in sponsored advertisements, URLs, Ad-Text, and Ad-Titles despite the earlier judgments. According to the plaintiffs, internet users searching for the plaintiffs’ services were being redirected toward unrelated or competing businesses through deceptively similar branding elements, thereby enabling advertisers to commercially benefit from the plaintiffs’ goodwill. The plaintiffs therefore initiated proceedings under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 alleging wilful disobedience of the earlier injunction orders by Google and other intermediary defendants.

Competing Interpretations of the Earlier Court Orders

Before the Delhi High Court, the plaintiffs argued that the earlier judgments imposed an obligation upon the intermediary defendants to ensure that the protected marks did not appear in Ad-Text, Ad-Title, or URLs of third-party advertisements. According to the plaintiffs, the continued appearance of such advertisements demonstrated deliberate non-compliance with the Court’s earlier directions.

The intermediary defendants disputed these allegations and argued that the earlier judgments were confined only to complaints concerning use of trademarks as keywords within the advertising program. Google contended that no judicial direction required proactive monitoring or automatic blocking of advertisements containing the plaintiffs’ marks in visible advertisement content without receipt of a specific complaint from the trademark proprietor.

The defendants further submitted that the disputed advertisements and URLs had already been removed after notices from the plaintiffs and that the takedown process operated in accordance with Google’s internal advertising policy and subsequent procedural directions issued by the Court.

Contempt Jurisdiction and the Court’s Findings

The principal issue before the Delhi High Court concerned whether the continued appearance of certain advertisements established wilful disobedience necessary for invoking contempt jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC. While analysing the scope of contempt jurisdiction, the Court reiterated that such proceedings are penal in nature and therefore require clear evidence of deliberate and conscious disobedience of judicial orders.

The Court relied upon Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj², where the Supreme Court held that contempt jurisdiction requires proof of wilful disobedience. Reliance was also placed upon Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh³, which emphasised that contempt powers must be exercised cautiously because of their serious consequences. Similarly, the Court referred to Three Cheers Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. CESE Ltd.⁴, where it was held that contempt proceedings are not maintainable where the alleged violation arises from a bona fide interpretation of judicial directions.

Further reliance was placed on Jiva Institute of Vedic Science and Culture v. Puneet Chhatwal⁵ and Sudhir Vasudeva v. M. George Ravishekaran⁶, where it was clarified that contempt jurisdiction cannot be used to reinterpret or expand the scope of earlier judicial orders beyond their explicit terms.

Applying these principles, the Delhi High Court observed that the operative directions contained in the earlier judgments were confined to investigation of complaints relating to use of the plaintiffs’ trademarks as keywords. The Court held that while Google’s internal advertising policy prohibited use of trademarks in Ad-Text or Ad-Title, the earlier judgments had not imposed any independent judicial direction requiring proactive monitoring of such visible advertisement content.

The Court therefore rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the intermediary defendants were under an obligation to automatically prevent appearance of the trademarks in Ad-Text, Ad-Title, or URLs without any complaint mechanism being triggered. The Court also observed that the disputed advertisements had already been removed after notice from the plaintiffs and that the defendants had acted in accordance with platform policy and subsequent court directions.

Accordingly, the Delhi High Court held that the material on record did not establish any wilful or deliberate disobedience of the earlier judgments and dismissed the contempt petition.

Conclusion

The decision in DRS Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. Google LLC & Ors. highlights the Delhi High Court’s cautious approach toward expanding contempt jurisdiction in online trademark enforcement disputes. The ruling clarifies that intermediary liability in digital advertising ecosystems cannot automatically translate into contempt liability unless clear and explicit judicial directions have been deliberately violated.

For stakeholders in the IP domain, the judgment underscores the importance of seeking precise and operationally enforceable directions at the injunction stage itself, particularly in disputes involving online intermediaries and algorithm-driven advertising systems. The ruling also illustrates that while trademark infringement claims may continue independently, contempt jurisdiction demands a significantly higher threshold requiring demonstrable and wilful disobedience of judicial authority.

1. DRS Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. Google LLC & Ors., 2026:DHC:5102 ↩︎
2. Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC 204 ↩︎
3. Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21 ↩︎
4. Three Cheers Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. CESE Ltd., (2008) 16 SCC 592 ↩︎
5. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science and Culture v. Puneet Chhatwal, CCP(O) 33/2022 in CS(COMM) 602/2016 ↩︎
6. Sudhir Vasudeva v. M. George Ravishekaran, (2014) 3 SCC 373 ↩︎

Expositor(s): Adv. Aparna Shukla